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Andrea I. Luppi1,2, Michael M. Craig1,2, Ioannis Pappas 1,2,8, Paola Finoia 1,3, Guy B. Williams2,4,
Judith Allanson2,5, John D. Pickard2,3,4, Adrian M. Owen6, Lorina Naci7, David K. Menon1,4 &
Emmanuel A. Stamatakis 1,2*

Prominent theories of consciousness emphasise different aspects of neurobiology, such as
the integration and diversity of information processing within the brain. Here, we combine
graph theory and dynamic functional connectivity to compare resting-state functional MRI
data from awake volunteers, propofol-anaesthetised volunteers, and patients with disorders
of consciousness, in order to identify consciousness-speciﬁc patterns of brain function. We
demonstrate that cortical networks are especially affected by loss of consciousness during
temporal states of high integration, exhibiting reduced functional diversity and compromised
informational capacity, whereas thalamo-cortical functional disconnections emerge during
states of higher segregation. Spatially, posterior regions of the brain’s default mode network
exhibit reductions in both functional diversity and integration with the rest of the brain during
unconsciousness. These results show that human consciousness relies on spatio-temporal
interactions between brain integration and functional diversity, whose breakdown may
represent a generalisable biomarker of loss of consciousness, with potential relevance for
clinical practice.
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he brain is a remarkably complex system, with activity
patterns poised at a near-critical point between order and
chaos1, integrating inputs from different modalities into a
uniﬁed experience of the world. Recent scientiﬁc theories of
consciousness have appealed to these characteristics to explain
how the diverse repertoire of human conscious experiences arises
from brain function2–7.
Speciﬁcally, consciousness is thought to require brain-wide
information broadcasting by a “global workspace”, whereby segregated component processes are integrated and made available
for undertaking higher cognitive functions, producing a unitary
experience4,5. Indeed, estimates of brain integration derived from
graph theory8 are reduced in brain networks under propofol
anaesthesia9–11 and in patients with disorders of consciousness12.
In information theory, entropy quantiﬁes the diversity or
unpredictability of information content13. Using the entropy of
different aspects of brain function to estimate the diversity of
information, various studies have shown reduced entropy when
consciousness fades, such as during sleep or anaesthesia14–16, and
more recently also in patients with disorders of consciousness17.
Conversely, entropy increases during states of putatively
enhanced consciousness induced by psychedelics (see CarhartHarris (2018) for a recent review), supporting the idea that
entropy, as measured from functional imaging, may reﬂect the
richness and diversity of conscious experiences.
The inﬂuential integrated information theory identiﬁes consciousness with a quantity Φ, combining integration and diversity
of information within a system2,3. Studies using a proxy for Φ
based on the evoked EEG response to transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), known as perturbational complexity index, have
been highly successful at discriminating between different states
of consciousness, including anaesthesia and disorders of consciousness18–21. These studies demonstrate that diversity and
integration are both relevant for consciousness, and raise the
question of how they relate to each other neurobiologically. In
particular, although the activity and connectivity of integrative
hubs, such as the posterior cingulate/precuneus and other regions
of the default mode network (DMN) are highly affected by loss of
consciousness22,23, a recent study reported that the entropy of the
DMN and other higher-order cortices were only minimally
affected by propofol anaesthesia14.
To address this discrepancy, here we relate voxel-level measures of integration and entropy derived from resting-state
functional MRI (rs-fMRI), to identify any regions showing consistent alterations in both quantities when consciousness is lost. If
both entropy and integration are related to consciousness, then
we should expect their alterations during unconsciousness to
show some overlap in the brain, thereby identifying regions
whose function is most relevant for consciousness.
Moreover, brain functions vary over time24, exhibiting
dynamics that have recently been shown to differ between states
of consciousness in both anaesthetized non-human primates11
and human patients with disorders of consciousness17. In awake
healthy volunteers, the dynamics of brain functional connectivity
have been shown to transition between states displaying higher
segregation or integration25,26, with the latter being related to
higher arousal and improved cognitive performance. Thus, the
interplay of brain entropy and integration in supporting consciousness may occur temporally as well as spatially, and we set
out to investigate this hypothesis.
A further consideration is that there are multiple ways in which
loss of consciousness may occur, whether through pharmacological interventions having widespread effects on brain function,
or hypoxic-ischemic injuries affecting cortical and subcortical
regions of the brain, or relatively localised traumatic brain injuries. In order to identify neurobiological signatures of loss of
2

consciousness that are generalisable across these multiple conditions, rather than being speciﬁc to any of them, here we investigate alterations in brain functions and dynamics during
unconsciousness arising in common from all of the abovementioned causes. Speciﬁcally, we compare brain measures of 16
healthy volunteers while awake and while undergoing deep
anaesthesia with the common intravenous agent propofol, and we
also compare the same 16 awake volunteers with 22 patients
diagnosed with a disorder of consciousness (DOC; unresponsive
wakefulness syndrome/vegetative state (UWS) or minimally
conscious state, MCS) as a result of traumatic or hypoxic/
ischemic brain injury.
Focusing on results that are common across the two datasets,
we demonstrate that in both DOC patients and healthy volunteers
undergoing propofol anaesthesia, measures of brain functional
diversity and integrative capacity are related in both space and
time, and their interactions are altered during unconsciousness.
Furthermore, brain dynamics are also altered during unconsciousness: temporal states of high integration exhibit reduced
integration and functional diversity in unconscious individuals,
unlike predominantly segregated states. Additionally, thalamocortical disconnections become evident during temporal states of
high segregation, whereas highly integrated states are primarily
characterised by altered cortico-cortical connectivity; thus, our
results contribute to reconcile discrepant ﬁndings in the literature
about the relative roles of cortico-cortical and thalamo-cortical
connectivity for consciousness9,10,22,27–30. Finally, we show that
in both datasets, whole-brain connectivity and temporal entropy
are both reduced in key regions of the brain’s default mode
network. By combining different biological approaches with
diverse analytical methods investigating both spatial and temporal aspects of brain function, these results advance our
understanding of conscious and unconscious states in the human
brain, and their underlying brain dynamics.
Results
Reduced global integration and functional diversity. To
determine how integration and entropy interact spatially, we
quantiﬁed the regional distribution of unconsciousness-related
changes in these metrics across the brain. We ﬁrst investigated
how loss of consciousness affected the global functional connectivity of each region with the rest of the brain, which we took
as reﬂecting its capacity for global integration. We estimated this
with the Intrinsic Connectivity Contrast (ICC), a voxel-wise
measure that uses graph theory to quantify each voxel’s wholebrain connectivity, computed as the sum of the squared Pearson
correlation between that voxel’s timeseries and the timeseries of
every other voxel in the brain31.
Both localised decreases and increases in ICC were evident
under deep propofol anaesthesia (Supplementary Fig. 1a and
Supplementary Table 1), with prominent reductions in posterior
cingulate/precuneus (PCC/PCU), medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC), left angular gyrus (AG) and left supramarginal gyrus
(SMG) and medial temporal lobe (MTL). Increases were
primarily localised in the bilateral caudate, and bilateral preand postcentral gyri.
Analogous results were observed when comparing the healthy
volunteer cohort during their awake scan and the DOC patients
(Supplementary Fig. 1b). ICC reductions were evident in PCC/
PCU, left AG, mPFC, bilateral MTL, supramarginal gyri (SMG),
opercular, postcentral and inferior parietal cortices, right fusiform
and inferior temporal cortex (Supplementary Table 2). Increases
were localised in the hippocampal formations, cerebellum, and
bilateral caudate; the latter was shared with the propofol dataset
(Supplementary Fig. 2 and Supplementary Table 3).
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Fig. 1 Brain maps of consciousness-related reductions in intrinsic
connectivity contrast (ICC, reﬂecting integrative capacity) and sample
entropy (reﬂecting functional diversity over time), and their overlaps
between and within datasets. Regions in blue display reduced ICC during
unconsciousness (increases are shown in Supplementary Figs. 1 and 2);
yellow indicates reduced sample entropy during unconsciousness; and red
indicates regions showing both reduced entropy and ICC. Overlaps
between anaesthesia (left) and DOC (right) are shown in the middle.
Images are shown on medial and lateral surfaces of a smoothed standard
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI-152) structural T1 scan, in
neurological convention

We then quantiﬁed functional diversity as the sample entropy
(SampEn) of voxelwise blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD)
signal timeseries32 (see Methods). Sample entropy, which is
derived from Approximate Entropy (ApEn)33, is an approximation of Kolmogorov complexity for timeseries and is stable even
for data sequences of limited length, such as fMRI timeseries32.
SampEn quantiﬁes how unpredictable a signal is, such that low
values of SampEn would indicate that the signal is highly
stereotyped - with a perfectly predictable series, such as [1,1,1,…]
having a SampEn of zero, and SampEn increasing as the series
becomes more disordered32.
Widespread reductions in BOLD signal entropy were observed
under anaesthesia, localised in the PCC/PCU, left AG extending
to MTL and inferior parietal, and left middle and inferior frontal
gyri. No increases were observed (Supplementary Fig. 1c and
Supplementary Table 4). Crucially, reductions in BOLD signal
entropy overlapped with ICC reduction due to anaesthesia in
PCC/PCU, left AG and left SMG (Fig. 1, left panel). Likewise,
DOC patients showed extensive sample entropy reductions in
PCC/PCU and mPFC, as well as bilateral AG extending to
inferior parietal, left inferior and middle and right middle and
superior frontal cortices, and inferior and medial temporal lobes,
including fusiform gyri and hippocampal formations (Supplementary Fig. 1d and Supplementary Table 5). Again, these
entropy reductions largely overlapped with ICC reductions in our
group of patients (Fig. 1, right panel).
Although sample entropy requires the choice of two parameters m and r (see Methods), entropy results were robust to
parameter choices (Supplementary Fig. 3a, b). However, the use
of a smaller smoothing kernel did result in fewer and smaller
clusters of signiﬁcantly different SampEn (Supplementary Fig. 3c,
d). In particular, the left SMG cluster disappeared when
comparing awake and anaesthetised individuals, and the left
angular gyrus cluster was substantially reduced in size. Nevertheless, the precuneus cluster was maintained, despite the reduced
size, further highlighting the speciﬁc importance of the default
mode network.
In order to exclude the effect of subject motion as a possible
confounding factor, we also compared the sample entropy of the
head motion signals (three translations and three rotations)
between the awake healthy controls and the two conditions of
unconsciousness, using the same parameters as for the brain
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entropy analysis described above. Although a signiﬁcant reduction in the entropy of the head motion in the horizontal plane
was observed when comparing DOC patients to controls
(Supplementary Table 6), this was not the case for deep propofol
anaesthesia, where instead an increase in the entropy of the
timeseries of rotations around the vertical axis was observed,
compared with the awake condition (Supplementary Table 7).
To characterise the consciousness-speciﬁc alterations of
entropy and integration in the spatial domain, we then computed
the overlaps between propofol- and brain injury-induced
unconsciousness. The posterior cingulate/precuneus, left angular
gyrus and left supramarginal gyrus showed reductions in both
sample entropy and ICC, for both anaesthesia and disorders of
consciousness (Fig. 1, central panel). To establish the spatial
extent of connectivity changes we carried out follow-up seedbased analysis from these regions31, which showed that during
unconsciousness the connections between PCC and angular gyrus
with the frontal portions of the DMN were attenuated, as were
their anticorrelations with fronto-parietal control networks
(FPN), in line with previous evidence27,30,34–39; reduced DMNFPN anticorrelation was also observed from the SMG, which is
part of the FPN (Supplementary Figs. 4–9).
Dynamic functional connectivity alterations. Since consciousness is believed to require a global workspace, integrating relevant
information from separate modules4,5, we then applied dynamic
functional connectivity analysis24 to identify temporal states of
high integration and high segregation25,26, and to investigate how
loss of consciousness inﬂuenced their probability of occurrence
and their functional diversity.
Following the approach of Shine et al.25, the integrated and
segregated states were identiﬁed by using a machine learning
algorithm, known as k-means clustering, to separate subject- and
session-speciﬁc sliding windows of dynamic functional connectivity (FC) into two clusters; these were then labelled as the
“predominantly integrated” and “predominantly segregated”
clusters, based on their graph-theoretical properties of participation coefﬁcient and within-module degree Z-score25, and each
cluster was summarised by one centroid matrix of functional
connectivity (see Methods).
Having computed the dynamic states of integration and
segregation, we were able to investigate whether each state was
similarly altered during unconsciousness induced by anaesthesia
and injury, in terms of its pattern of functional connections
(Methods). For comparison purposes, we also carried out these
analyses for what we term “static” FC (spanning the entire scan
duration; Fig. 2 and Supplementary Fig. 10).
In line with previous work, the overall picture from static FC
revealed disconnections between the bilateral thalami and the
precuneus29, disconnections within DMN regions, reduced
anticorrelations between DMN and FPN (showing as unconscious > conscious)22,23, and within-FPN connectivity increases.
Dynamic analysis of states that were partitioned as primarily
integrated or primarily segregated revealed that alterations in
cortico-cortical connectivity were primarily observed during the
integrated state, whereas thalamo-cortical disconnections (leftlateralised) were speciﬁc to the predominantly segregated state
(Fig. 2 and Supplementary Fig. 10).
Temporal integration. To identify the role of temporal integration in consciousness, we investigated how loss of consciousness
affected the time spent in each state. For each individual, we
computed the proportion of dynamic matrices assigned to each
state, out of the total number (as there were only two states, the
two analyses are complementary, and only one is reported).
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Fig. 2 Common differences in functional connectivity (r values) when
considering both awake volunteers > anaesthetized (repeated-measures
t-test, FDR-corrected), and awake volunteers > DOC patients (two-samples
t-test, FDR-corrected). a Differences from static FC (computed over the
entire scanning length). b Differences from dynamic FC, observed only in
the integrated state (left) or only in the segregated state (right). Hot
colours indicate conscious > unconscious, and cold indicate unconscious >
conscious (increased correlation, or decreased anticorrelation). Source data
are provided as a Source Data ﬁle

Contrary to our expectation, time spent in the predominantly
integrated state was not signiﬁcantly different between awake
(M = 0.61, SD = 0.09) and anaesthetized volunteers (M = 0.55,
SD = 0.12), t (15) = 1.79, g = 0.56, p = 0.093 (repeated-measures
t-test). Likewise, the awake volunteers did not signiﬁcantly differ
from the DOC patients (M = 0.63, SD = 0.13, t (36) = −0.50, g =
−0.16, p = 0.623 (two-samples t-test; Supplementary Fig. 11).
Optimal information capacity. However, we reasoned that
unconsciousness may also alter the network properties of the
brain during each individual state of time-resolved functional
connectivity. We used the graph-theoretical property of smallworldness to investigate this possibility (Methods). Small-world
networks allow for cost-efﬁcient organisation, by maximising
local communication and minimising costly long-distance connections, thus balancing integration and segregation40,41. This
measure is therefore often employed to estimate the optimality of
a network’s information capacity11.
When considering FC calculated over the entire run, we
observed a reduction in network small-worldness between the
awake volunteers (M = 2.21, SD = 0.22) and DOC patients (M =
1.97, SD = 0.36, t(36) = 2.31, g = 0.74, p = 0.028, two-samples
t-test); however, the healthy volunteers when anaesthetized did
not show signiﬁcant differences in small-worldness from when
they were awake (M = 2.04, SD = 0.27, t (15) = 2.05, g = 0.66,
p = 0.063, repeated-measures t-test). (Fig. 3, top left).
Nevertheless, adopting a dynamic approach revealed that the
integrated state was characterised by reduced small-worldness for
both anaesthetised healthy individuals (M = 1.90, SD = 0.25,
t (15) = 3.01, g = 1.03, p = 0.010, repeated-measures t-test); and
DOC patients (M = 1.89, SD = 0.26, t (36) = 3.41, g = 1.10, p =
0.002, two-samples t-test) when compared to consciousness
(M = 2.15, SD = 0.21) (Fig. 3 middle left). Conversely, during the
segregated state there was no signiﬁcant difference in smallworldness between the awake individuals (M = 2.07, SD = 0.24)
and either the same individuals under propofol anaesthesia,
(M = 1.97, SD = 0.24, t (15) = 1.11, g = 0.37, p = 0.286, repeatedmeasures t-test) or the DOC patients (M = 1.91, SD = 0.40,
t (36) = 1.40, g = 0.45, p = 0.171, two-samples t-test) (Fig. 3
bottom left). These results were robust to the choice of network
node and edge deﬁnition, in both datasets—although reduced
small-worldness was also observed during the segregated states,
when employing liberal thresholds for edge deﬁnition (Supplementary Fig. 12 and Supplementary Tables 8–10).
4

Entropy of temporal states. We then investigated whether
entropy also showed state-speciﬁc alterations during unconsciousness. Whereas voxelwise sample entropy (as discussed
earlier) quantiﬁes the unpredictability of the signal from each
voxel over time, we also wished to examine a metric that better
represented how these changes related to information exchange.
To do this, we then tested levels of consciousness based on an
alternative measure of brain entropy developed by Saenger
et al.42, which quantiﬁes how diverse the pattern of connections
of each brain region is, in terms of the mean normalised Shannon
entropy of each region’s distribution of FC values (“connectivity
entropy”; see Methods).
For FC calculated over the entire run, signiﬁcantly reduced
mean connectivity entropy was observed between the awake
(M = 0.90, SD = 0.01) and deep conditions (M = 0.89, SD = 0.01,
t (15) = 2.69, p = 0.017, g = 0.85, repeated-measures t-test; Fig. 3,
top right). Compared with the awake healthy controls, mean
connectivity entropy was also reduced for the DOC patients
(M = 0.88, SD = 0.01, t (36) = 3.26, p = 0.002, g = 1.05, twosamples t-test; Fig. 3, top right).
Network-speciﬁc investigations, based on the seven-network
parcellation of Yeo et al.43, were also performed to identify
whether the observed entropy reductions were uniform across the
brain, or localised to speciﬁc resting-state networks. This analysis
revealed that the signiﬁcant reduction in connectivity entropy
under anaesthesia at whole-brain level was reﬂected by a
reduction in DMN regions (Supplementary Fig. 13a and
Supplementary Table 11). In DOC patients, the global effect
corresponded to reductions in connectivity entropy of the DMN,
but also FPN, dorsal attention, visual and limbic networks
(Supplementary Fig. 13b and Supplementary Table 12).
Further state-speciﬁc analyses provided insight into the
temporal origin of differences in connectivity entropy. Signiﬁcantly reduced mean connectivity entropy was observed in the
predominantly integrated state between participants when they
were awake (M = 0.904, SD = 0.007) and anaesthetised (M =
0.897, SD = 0.010, t(15) = 2.22, p = 0.046, g = 0.80, repeatedmeasures t-test; Fig. 3, middle right). This global reduction was
reﬂected by reduced connectivity entropy in the DMN (Supplementary Fig. 13c and Supplementary Table 13), in line with
results from static FC.
Mean connectivity entropy in the predominantly integrated
state was also reduced for DOC patients (M = 0.89, SD = 0.01,
t(36) = 3.43, p = 0.002, g = 1.10, two-samples t-test) when
compared with the awake volunteers (Fig. 3, middle right). The
global reduction in connectivity entropy in the patient group
reﬂected signiﬁcant reductions in DMN, FPN and limbic
networks (Supplementary Fig. 13d and Supplementary Table 14),
reﬂecting results from static FC.
Conversely, no signiﬁcant reductions in mean connectivity
entropy of the predominantly segregated state were observed
between awake (M = 0.93, SD = 0.01) and anaesthetised participants (M = 0.92, SD = 0.01, t(15) = 1.43, g = 0.60, p = 0.174,
repeated-measures t-test), either globally or for speciﬁc subnetworks (Fig. 3, bottom right and Supplementary Fig. 13e and
Supplementary Table 15). Thus, a marked contrast existed
between the impact of anaesthesia on connectivity entropy in
integrated and segregated states.
Instead, the mean connectivity entropy in the predominantly
segregated state was signiﬁcantly reduced when comparing the
awake healthy controls with DOC patients (M = 0.91, SD = 0.01)
t(36) = 2.52, p = 0.014, g = 0.81, two-samples t-test. (Fig. 3,
bottom right). This reduction of global entropy in the segregated
state of DOC patients was reﬂected in reductions in DMN, visual,
somatomotor, dorsal attention and limbic networks (Supplementary Fig. 13f and Supplementary Table 16).
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Fig. 3 Violin plots of the mean connectivity entropy (left) and small-world values (right) for the static (a, b), integrated (c, d) and segregated (e, f) states,
comparing conscious healthy controls and unconscious individuals due to anaesthesia (repeated_measures t-tests) and brain injury (two-samples t-tests).
The small-world index was calculated as the ratio of normalised clustering coefﬁcient to normalised characteristic path length. n.s. not signiﬁcant; *p <
0.05; **p < 0.01; white circle, mean; centre line, median; box limits, upper and lower quartiles; whiskers, 1.5× interquartile range. Source data are provided
as a Source Data ﬁle

Comparison of different DOC aetiologies. To assess whether
our results for the DOC patients may be primarily driven by one
particular aetiology (traumatic or hypoxic/ischemic brain injury),
we repeated the analyses presented above, but including only the
DOC patients, divided into two groups comparing DOC patients
with traumatic brain injury (TBI; N = 10) and patients with
hypoxic/ischemic injury (HBI; N = 12). No signiﬁcant differences
were observed between the two groups of DOC patients (Supplementary Table 17 and Supplementary Fig. 14).
Discussion
We combined graph theory and dynamic functional connectivity
to compare human fMRI data during conscious wakefulness, and
during unconsciousness caused by anoxic brain injury, traumatic
brain injury, and propofol anaesthesia. To identify general markers of loss of consciousness irrespective of its speciﬁc origin, we
focused on brain alterations that were common to both datasets.
Our results reveal that consciousness relies on the interaction
between functional diversity as measured by entropy and integration, in both the spatial and temporal domains.

Spatially, we show that key regions of the default mode network, especially the posterior cingulate/precuneus, exhibit concurrent reductions in integrative capacity and functional
diversity, estimated by the intrinsic connectivity contrast (in line
with the ICC reductions under sevoﬂurane reported in other
studies31) and sample entropy of BOLD signal timeseries,
respectively. The ICC measures the integrative capacity of a given
brain region because it reﬂects changes in either the inputs the
region receives, or the outputs it broadcasts—both of which are
crucial aspects of the process of integrating information. Being
based on functional connectivity, the ICC is agnostic with regard
to directionality; however, computational modelling has shown
that nodes with high degree, to which ICC is related, tend to be
the target of information ﬂow from nodes with lower degree44.
Thus, our results may suggest that during unconsciousness, cortical hubs in the posterior DMN regions receive less information
from the rest of the brain, and consequently exhibit reduced
entropy, reﬂecting reduced informational content and diversity.
Since loss of consciousness is expected to compromise the ability
to exchange and integrate information from across the cortex in
the brain’s global workspace, our results support the identiﬁcation
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of the latter at least in part with the DMN. They also support the
predictions of integrated information theory, according to which
unconsciousness can result from a loss of information and
diversity as well as integrative capacity2,3.
In the temporal domain, the present work advances our
knowledge by demonstrating the dynamic nature of DMN
involvement in loss of consciousness. For both DOC and anaesthesia the predominantly integrated state, which is related to
higher cognitive performance and alertness25, was characterised
by reduced DMN-FPN anticorrelations. Conversely, disconnections between DMN and thalamus were speciﬁc to the predominantly segregated state, and within-DMN connectivity
reductions were observed in both states. Thus, the results presented herein reﬁne our understanding of the relative importance
of thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical connectivity for
consciousness,9,10,22,27–30 by revealing that alterations of DMN
cortico-cortical and thalamo-cortical connections appear to vary
dynamically, depending on the brain’s state of integration or
segregation.
Dynamic FC analysis also revealed interactions between functional diversity and integration in the temporal dimension: the
predominantly integrated state appears particularly vulnerable to
consciousness-related reductions in the mean Shannon entropy of
each region’s pattern of functional connectivity. Although this
state was not visited less often during unconsciousness, we did
ﬁnd reduced small-worldness, a measure of information capacity,
suggesting that these qualities of the integrated state may be more
relevant for consciousness than time spent in it, at least in the
context of resting-state data. It is important to bear in mind that
applications of small-worldness and other graph-theoretical
measures to brain networks are inherently limited by the noisiness of imaging modalities, such as fMRI45—a concern that we
sought to address in this work by replicating our results pertaining to small-worldness across multiple thresholds, and with
different node and edge deﬁnitions for our networks.
The reductions in brain entropy that we observed are consistent with the recent Entropic Brain Hypothesis6,7 and with
reports of reduced entropy with diminished consciousness15,16,46,
including using dynamic functional connectivity17, but they
appear in partial contrast with those of Liu et al.14. These authors
reported that entropy diminishes in primary sensory systems
when transitioning from light to deep propofol sedation, but not
in DMN or other higher cognitive systems. However, the present
reductions in DMN entropy were obtained from two different
measures (spatial and temporal), in both anaesthesia and DOC
patients, demonstrating their robustness. Moreover, it has been
shown that at propofol doses lower than ~2.7 µg mL−1, which is
when EEG slow-wave activity reaches saturation (SWAS)28,47, the
brain is still responsive to external stimuli, despite behavioural
unresponsiveness, and thus perceptual awareness is thought to
be preserved28. Although SWAS cannot be conﬁrmed, since
EEG monitoring was not present, the dose of propofol we
used was substantially higher than the one used by Liu et al.14,
and closer to SWAS-inducing level. Thus, preserved and reduced
DMN entropy in the two studies may reﬂect preserved and
compromised perceptual awareness, respectively—thereby
resolving the apparent discrepancy, in line with extensive
evidence relating DMN alterations to unconsciousness, for both
anaesthesia22,27,30,38,48–50 and DOC23,34–37,39,51–54.
In the present study, the differences in network properties
under anaesthesia—concurring with those observed in patients
with DOC—only became apparent in the integrated state of
dynamic FC, whereas static FC (i.e., computed over the entire
scanning duration) failed to detect them. Indeed, earlier studies
using only static FC analysis even reported increased smallworldness under propofol9,55 whereas reduced small-worldness
6

under propofol was later demonstrated using dynamic FC in
macaques, consistent with our results11. In line with recent work
combining graph theory and dynamic functional connectivity to
study DOC patients17, our results further demonstrate the
importance of time-resolved analyses in the study of consciousness, to uncover otherwise hidden similarities between different
datasets.
Importantly, this work dealt exclusively with data from resting
state scanning, which is known to preferentially recruit the
DMN56; there is evidence that under different paradigms other
networks, such as the auditory and FPN, are also able to distinguish between conscious and unconscious states57. Further work
could also relate the present results to independent markers of
consciousness, such as SWAS28 or naturalistic paradigms57, and
determine whether they can discriminate between different levels
of sedation, or different disorders of consciousness.
Indeed, a limitation of this work is that we have implicitly
assumed that both individuals under deep propofol anaesthesia
and UWS and MCS patients are unconscious. However, MCS
patients owe their classiﬁcation to occasional signs of volitional
behaviour, which may reﬂect minimal levels of consciousness58.
Furthermore, disorders of consciousness are prone to relatively
high rate of misdiagnosis, with patients categorized as UWS
subsequently exhibiting signs of awareness when more sensitive
measures are employed57. Adding to this complication, dreaming
has been reported during anaesthesia in up to 27% of cases59.
Consequently, despite lack of behavioural responsiveness it is not
possible to say conclusively that all individuals examined here
were completely unconscious, in the sense of having no subjective
experiences. Using additional markers of consciousness, such as
SWAS28, PCI18 or naturalistic paradigms57 may be required in
future studies to provide additional evidence of unconsciousness
independent of behavioural responsiveness.
Other issues of consideration include the scanner hardware
and acquisition parameters, which were not identical for the two
cohorts discussed in the article. A further confound may be that
DOC patients had reduced entropy of motion timeseries in the
horizontal plane compared to awake controls, whereas anaesthesia led to increased entropy in the rotation around the vertical
axis. Additionally, it is important to consider how the anaesthetic
agent can indirectly affect measures of brain activity by altering
physiological parameters, such as arterial concentration of carbon
dioxide. Since anaesthetized subjects in this study were not
intubated but rather spontaneously ventilating, propofol-induced
respiratory depression may have resulted in hypoventilation and
increased arterial CO2 levels. We did not measure end-tidal or
arterial CO2 concentrations in our subjects. However, propofol
only has relatively minor effects on brain hemodynamics60, and
BOLD ﬂuctuation amplitudes, connectivity strength and the
spatial extent of connectivity maps have been shown to be
unaffected by hypercapnia during the resting state in rats61, thus
mitigating this concern.
In addition to noting that both motion and cardiac, respiratory
and physiological noise artefacts are accounted for in our
denoising procedure (see Methods), we believe that these concerns should be further mitigated by our decision to adopt a
comparative approach in this work, focusing only on results that
were observed in both DOC and anaesthesia: if any of the results
we observed when comparing DOC patients and controls had
been due solely to the differences in acquisition and scanning
parameters, or subject motion, such results should not have
also been observed under conditions of anaesthesia, where
those confounds were not present thanks to the within-subjects
design—and vice versa for the concern about hypercapnia during
anaesthesia. Moreover, using the same group of awake healthy
volunteers as controls for both states of unconsciousness helps
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to ensure that the results we have found are not confounded by
differences in control groups, but rather represent deviations
from the same common baseline. Therefore, we expect that the
common results we report should represent genuine markers of
loss of consciousness, rather than reﬂecting any idiosyncratic
aspects of the speciﬁc datasets used here.
Overall, we have demonstrated that loss of consciousness—
whether due to propofol anaesthesia, hypoxic/ischemic brain
injury, or traumatic brain injury—is accompanied by reduced
functional diversity and integrative capacity in the posterior
DMN, especially during temporal states of high integration.
Additionally, our time-resolved analysis led us to the discovery
that the relative importance of cortico-cortical and thalamocortical connectivity in supporting consciousness varies dynamically with the brain’s state of integration or segregation,
thereby clarifying a previous point of controversy in the literature.
The effects reported were observed in both DOC patients (with
no differences between TBI and HBI patients) and healthy
volunteers undergoing propofol anaesthesia. This replication
increases the robustness of our results, and it allowed us to narrow down on properties of brain function that are likely to be
consciousness-speciﬁc, whose alterations may, therefore, represent general neurobiological signatures of loss of consciousness,
with potential translational value for the detection of consciousness during surgery or in patients with a diagnosis of vegetative
state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome.
Methods
Volunteer recruitment for propofol data collection. The propofol data were
collected at the Robarts Research Institute in London, Ontario (Canada) between
May and November 2014. A total of 19 (18–40 years; 13 males) healthy, righthanded, native English speakers, with no history of neurological disorders were
recruited. The Health Sciences Research Ethics Board and Psychology Research
Ethics Board of Western University (Ontario, Canada) ethically approved this
study, and all relevant ethical guidelines were followed. Each volunteer provided
written informed consent, and received monetary compensation for their time. Due
to equipment malfunction or physiological impediments to anaesthesia in the
scanner, data from three participants (1 male) were excluded from analyses,
leaving 16.
Procedure and design for propofol data collection. Resting-state fMRI data were
acquired at no sedation (Awake), and Deep sedation (anaesthetised: Ramsay score
of 562). Ramsay level was independently assessed by two anaesthesiologists and one
anaesthesia nurse in the scanning room before fMRI acquisition began, in each
condition. Additionally, participants performed two tests: a computerised auditory
target-detection task and a memory test of verbal recall, to evaluate their level of
wakefulness independently of the assessors.
For the Awake condition, participants did not receive a Ramsey score, as this
scale is designed for patients in critical care. Instead, they had to be fully awake,
alert and communicating appropriately. An infrared camera located inside the
scanner was used to monitor wakefulness. For the Deep sedation condition,
propofol was administered intravenously using an AS50 auto syringe infusion
pump (Baxter Healthcare, Singapore); step-wise sedation increments sedation were
achieved using an effect-site/plasma steering algorithm combined with the
computer-controlled infusion pump. Further manual adjustments were performed
as required to reach target concentrations of propofol, as predicted by the TIVA
Trainer (European Society for Intravenous Aneaesthesia, eurosiva.eu)
pharmacokinetic simulation program. This software also speciﬁed the blood
concentrations of propofol, following the Marsh 3-compartment model, which
were used as targets for the pharmacokinetic model providing target-controlled
infusion. The initial propofol target effect-site concentration was 0.6 µg mL−1, with
oxygen titrated to maintain SpO2 above 96%. Concentration was then increased by
increments of 0.3 µg mL−1, and Ramsay score was assessed: if lower than 5, a
further increment occurred. Participants were deemed to have reached Ramsay
level 5 once they stopped responding to verbal commands, were unable to engage
in conversation, and were rousable only to physical stimulation. Data acquisition
began once loss of behavioural responsiveness occurred for both tasks, and the
three assessors agreed that Ramsay sedation level 5 had been reached.
The mean estimated effect-site and plasma propofol concentrations were kept
stable by the pharmacokinetic model delivered via the TIVA Trainer infusion
pump; the mean estimated effect-site propofol concentration was 2.48 (1.82–3.14)
µg mL−1, and the mean estimated plasma propofol concentration was 2.68
(1.92–3.44) µg mL−1. Mean total mass of propofol administered was 486.58
(373.30–599.86) mg. These values of variability are typical for the pharmacokinetics
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and pharmacodynamics of propofol. Since the sedation procedure did not take
place in a hospital setting, airway security could not be ensured by intubation
during scanning, although two anaesthesiologists closely monitored each
participant. Consequently, scanner time was minimised to ensure return to normal
breathing following deep sedation. No state changes or movement were noted
during the deep sedation scanning for any of the participants included in the study.
In the scanner, subjects were instructed to relax with closed eyes, without falling
asleep; 8 min of fMRI scan without any task (“resting-state”) were acquired for each
participant. Additionally, a separate 5-min long scan was also acquired while a
plot-driven story was presented through headphones to participants, who were
instructed to listen while keeping their eyes closed. The present analysis focuses on
the resting-state data only; the story scan data are not relevant to the work
presented here, and will not be discussed further.
Propofol MRI data acquisition. MRI scanning was performed using a 3-Tesla
Siemens Tim Trio scanner (32-channel coil), and 256 functional volumes (echoplanar images, EPI) were collected from each participant, with the following
parameters: slices = 33, with 25% inter-slice gap; resolution = 3 mm isotropic;
TR = 2000 ms; TE = 30 ms; ﬂip angle = 75 degrees; matrix size = 64 × 64. The
order of acquisition was interleaved, bottom-up. Anatomical scanning was also
performed, acquiring a high-resolution T1-weighted volume (32-channel coil,
1 mm isotropic voxel size) with a 3D MPRAGE sequence, using the following
parameters: TA = 5 min, TE = 4.25 ms, 240 × 256 matrix size, 9 degrees FA.
Preprocessing of propofol fMRI data. We preprocessed the functional imaging
data using a standard pipeline, implemented within the SPM12-based (http://www.
ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) toolbox CONN (http://www.nitrc.org/projects/conn), version
17f63. The pipeline comprised the following steps: removal of the ﬁrst ﬁve scans, to
allow magnetisation to reach steady state; functional realignment and motion
correction; slice-timing correction to account for differences in time of acquisition
between slices; identiﬁcation of outlier scans for subsequent regression by means of
the quality assurance/artefact rejection software ART (http://www.nitrc.org/
projects/artifact_detect); spatial normalisation to Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI-152) standard space with 2 mm isotropic resampling resolution, using the
segmented grey matter image from each volunteer’s high-resolution T1-weighted
image, together with an a priori grey matter template; spatial smoothing with a
Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full width at half-maximum (FWHM).
Denoising of propofol fMRI data. To reduce noise due to cardiac and motion
artefacts, we applied the anatomical CompCor method of denoising the functional
data64, also implemented within the CONN toolbox. The anatomical CompCor
method involves regressing out of the functional data the following confounding
effects: the ﬁrst ﬁve principal components attributable to each individual’s white
matter signal, and the ﬁrst ﬁve components attributable to individual cerebrospinal
ﬂuid (CSF) signal; six subject-speciﬁc realignment parameters (three translations
and three rotations) as well as their ﬁrst- order temporal derivatives; the artefacts
identiﬁed by ART; and main effect of scanning condition64. Linear detrending was
also applied, and the subject-speciﬁc denoised BOLD signal timeseries were bandpass ﬁltered to eliminate both low-frequency drift effects and high-frequency noise,
thus retaining frequencies between 0.008 and 0.09 Hz.
Recruitment of DOC patients. A sample of 71 patients with disorders of consciousness was included in this study. Patients were recruited from specialised
long-term care centres. To be invited to the study, patients must have had a DOC
diagnosis, written informed consent to participation from their legal representative,
and were capable of being transported to Addenbrooke’s Hospital. The exclusion
criteria included any medical condition that made it unsafe for the patient to
participate (decision made by clinical personnel blinded to the speciﬁc aims of the
study) or any reason they are unsuitable to enter the MRI scanner environment
(e.g. non-MRI-safe implants), signiﬁcant pre-existing mental health problems, or
insufﬁcient English pre injury. After admission, each patient underwent clinical
and neuroimaging testing. Patients spent a total of ﬁve days (including arrival and
departure days) at Addenbrooke’s Hospital. Coma recovery scale-revised (CRS-R)
assessments were recorded at least daily for the ﬁve days of admission. If behaviours were indicative of awareness at any time, patients were classiﬁed as MCS;
otherwise UWS. We assigned MCS− or MCS+ sub-classiﬁcation if behaviours
were consistent throughout the week. The most frequent signs of consciousness in
MCS− patients are visual ﬁxation and pursuit, automatic motor reactions (e.g.
scratching, pulling the bed sheet) and localisation to noxious stimulation whereas
MCS+ patients can, in addition, follow simple commands, intelligibly verbalise or
intentionally communicate58,65. Scanning occurred at the Wolfson Brain Imaging
Centre, Addenbrooke’s Hospital, between January 2010 and December 2015;
medication prescribed to each patient was maintained during scanning. All clinical
investigations were conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki
and all relevant ethical guidelines. Ethical approval for testing patients was provided by the National Research Ethics Service (National Health Service, UK; LREC
reference 99/391).
As a focus of this study was on graph-theoretical properties of the brain,
patients were systematically excluded from the ﬁnal cohort analysed in this study
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can then be used as ROIs for further seed-based analysis in a data-driven fashion.
As the biological meaning of estimating functional connectivity of a white matter
voxel from BOLD data is dubious, the ICC analysis was restricted to grey matter
voxels.

Table 1 Demographic information for patients with
Disorders of Consciousness
Sex

Age

M
M
M
M
M
F
F
M
M
F
F
F
M
M
F
M
M
M
F
M
M
F

46
57
46
35
17
31
38
29
23
70
30
36
22
40
62
46
21
67
55
28
22
28

Months
post injury
23
14
4
34
17
9
13
68
4
11
6
6
5
14
7
10
7
14
6
14
12
8

Aetiology

Diagnosis

TBI
TBI
TBI
Anoxic
Anoxic
Anoxic
TBI
TBI
TBI
Cerebral bleed
Anoxic
Anoxic
Anoxic
Anoxic
Anoxic
Anoxic
TBI
TBI
Hypoxia
TBI
TBI
ADEM

UWS
MCS−
MCS
UWS
UWS
MCS−
MCS
MCS
MCS
MCS
MCS−
UWS
UWS
UWS
UWS
UWS
MCS
MCS−
UWS
MCS
MCS
UWS

CRSR Score
6
12
10
8
8
10
11
10
7
9
9
8
7
7
7
5
11
11
12
8
10
6

CRS-R coma recovery scale-revised, UWS unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, MCS minimally
conscious state, TBI traumatic brain injury

based on the following criteria: (1) large focal brain damage (i.e. more than 1/3 of
one hemisphere) as stated by an expert in neuroanatomy blinded to the patients’
diagnoses; (2) excessive head motion during resting state scanning (i.e. greater than
3 mm in translation and/or 3 degrees in rotation); (3) suboptimal segmentation and
normalization of images. A total of 22 adults (14 males; 17–70 years; mean time
post injury: 13 months) meeting diagnostic criteria for Unresponsive Wakefulness
Syndrome/Vegetative State or Minimally Conscious State due to brain injury were
included in this study (Table 1).
Patient MRI data acquisition. Resting-state fMRI was acquired for 10 min (300
volumes, TR = 2000 ms) using a Siemens Trio 3 T scanner (Erlangen, Germany).
Functional images (32 slices) were acquired using an echo planar sequence, with
the following parameters: 3 × 3 × 3.75 mm resolution, TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms,
78 degrees FA. Anatomical scanning was also performed, acquiring high-resolution
T1-weighted images with an MPRAGE sequence, using the following parameters:
TR = 2300 ms, TE = 2.47 ms, 150 slices, resolution 1 × 1 × 1 mm.
Preprocessing and denoising of patient fMRI data. Due to the presence of
deformations caused by brain injury, rather than relying on automated pipelines,
patients’ brains were individually preprocessed using SPM12, with visual inspections after each step. Additionally, to further reduce potential movement artefacts,
data underwent despiking with a hyperbolic tangent squashing function. The
remaining preprocessing and denoising steps were the same as described above for
the propofol data.
Intrinsic connectivity contrast. The global connectivity of each voxel with the rest
of the brain was analysed using the intrinsic connectivity contrast (ICC)31 as
implemented in the CONN toolbox. The ICC is a voxelwise measure of wholebrain connectivity based on the graph-theoretical notion of degree, which quantiﬁes the number of connections of a node with other nodes in its network.
Consistently with this notion, a higher ICC index corresponds to higher global
connectivity.
For each voxel i,
X 
ICCðiÞ ¼
r ðt ðiÞ; t ð jÞÞ2
ð1Þ
j

where i, j are voxels, and t(x) is the BOLD fMRI timeseries of voxel x. Subsequently,
the ICC values in the whole brain are normalised, by subtracting the average ICC
value across all voxels from the ICC of each voxel, and then dividing each voxel’s
ICC by the standard deviation of the ICC values across all voxels.
The result is a brain map of voxelwise Intrinsic Connectivity Contrasts, whose
distribution is Gaussian with zero mean and unitary variance. These ICC values
8

Voxelwise sample entropy of BOLD timeseries. Sample entropy (SampEn)
estimates the probability that similar sequences of observations in a timeseries will
remain similar. To compute SampEn, the timeseries is divided into chunks of m
timepoints each; chunks are then compared to ﬁnd the distance between them,
calculated as the largest absolute difference between any value in the ﬁrst chunk
and any value in the second chunk (Chebyshev distance). Two chunks are deemed
similar if their distance is less than a value r. Subsequently, the procedure is
repeated for chunks of length m + 1. The result is the probability that if two data
sequences of length m have distance less than r (i.e. are similar), then sequences of
length m + 1 also have distance less than r. The negative logarithm of this quantity
corresponds to SampEn.
SampEn ¼ log

A
B

ð2Þ

Here, A is the number of chunks of length m + 1 that are similar (have Chebyshev
distance less than r), and B is the number of chunks of length m that are similar.
Unlike Shannon entropy, SampEn depends on the choice of parameters m and
r. Here, we used m = 3 and r = 0.6 times the standard deviation of the data. These
parameter values were identiﬁed as optimal for calculation of SampEn from
resting-state fMRI data32. The entropy of the BOLD signal timeseries was
calculated using the Brain Entropy Mapping Toolbox (BENtbx; https://cfn.upenn.
edu/zewang/BENtbx.php)32 implemented in MATLAB. Each subject’s
preprocessed and denoised resting-state fMRI timeseries were used as inputs for
BENtbx. For each subject, the toolbox computed the SampEn of each voxel’s
timeseries, producing as output a subject-speciﬁc 3D brain map, with an entropy
value in each voxel. Each subject-speciﬁc image was then spatially smoothed with
the toolbox-recommended Gaussian kernel of 10 mm FWHM.
Overlap of sample entropy and ICC results. To identify the spatial overlaps
between maps of statistical differences in ICC or SampEn values in DOC and
anaesthesia, the fslmaths functions from FMRIB Software Library (FSL; https://fsl.
fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) was used to binarise the thresholded signiﬁcance maps. For each
dataset (anaesthesia and DOC), the binarised ICC and entropy masks were then
superimposed on each other, to ﬁnd regions that showed reductions in both
entropy and integration. Thus, one mask of ICC-entropy overlap was obtained for
each dataset. Finally, to identify whether the same regions showed common
reductions of entropy and integration in both DOC and anaesthesia, the two
dataset-speciﬁc masks of ICC-entropy overlap were themselves superimposed to
ﬁnd their overlap. The result was a single brain mask, showing those brain regions
that signiﬁcantly reduced both their temporal entropy and their global connectivity
between conscious and unconscious conditions, both in the propofol and the DOC
datasets.
Connectivity matrix construction. To construct matrices of functional connectivity, normalised brains were parcellated into 90 cortical and subcortical
regions of interest (ROIs) derived from the automated anatomical labelling (AAL)
atlas, covering the entire brain excluding Cerebellum and Vermis66.
Each ROI was also assigned to one of 7 well-characterised resting-state
networks (RSNs), derived from resting-state intrinsic connectivity analysis of 1000
healthy individuals43: default mode network (DMN), somatomotor (SOM), visual
(VIS), salience/ventral attention network (SAL), dorsal attention network (DAN),
fronto-parietal network (FPN), and limbic plus subcortical regions (LIM).
The timecourses of denoised BOLD signals were averaged between all voxels
belonging to a given AAL-derived ROI, using the CONN toolbox. The resulting
region-speciﬁc timecourses of each subject were then extracted for further analysis
in MATLAB version 2016a. Functional connectivity was estimated as the Pearson
correlation coefﬁcient between the timecourses of each pair of ROIs, over the full
scanning length.
Dynamic functional connectivity. Dynamic connectivity matrices were derived
using an overlapping sliding-window approach11,24. For each subject and each
condition, tapered sliding windows were obtained by convolving a rectangle of 22
TRs (44s) with a Gaussian kernel of 3 TRs, sliding with 1 TR step size. This resulted
in 229 windows/timepoints per condition for the awake and anaesthetised subjects,
and 273 windows for the DOC patients.
Within each of the resulting overlapping temporal windows of 22 TRs, a 90-by90 matrix of functional connectivity was estimated, with the connection between
each pair of AAL-derived ROIs being given by the Pearson correlation between
their timecourses within that window.
Derivation of integrated and segregated states. States of higher integration or
segregation were identiﬁed from the patterns of connectivity between regions, by
establishing a “cartographic proﬁle”25,26 based on the module assignments of each
ROI, considered as a network node. Firstly, within each time-resolved functional
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connectivity matrix (weighted and signed), the asymmetric algorithm of Rubinov
and Sporns67 implemented in the MATLAB-based Brain Connectivity Toolbox
(BCT; http://www.brain-connectivity-toolbox.net)8 was used to identify network
modules by applying the Louvain greedy algorithm68, which iteratively evaluates
different ways of assigning nodes to modules, in order to maximise the resulting
modularity function Q:
1 X
1
Q¼ þ
ðwij þ  eij þ ÞδMi Mj  þ
ðw   eij  Þδ Mi Mj
ð3Þ
υ
υ þ υ ij
j

where υ is the total weight of the graph (sum of all edges), wij is the (signed) weight
of the edge between nodes i and j, eij is the weight of an edge divided by the total
weight of the graph (positive and negative edges are denoted with ‘ + ’ and ‘−’
superscripts, respectively), and δMiMj is set to 1 when nodes i and j are in the same
module and 0 otherwise.
In the case of signed graphs, a module is deﬁned as a group of nodes that are
positively correlated with each other, but negatively correlated with nodes
belonging to different modules8. Due to its stochastic nature, the algorithm was
repeated for 100 iterations for each time-resolved network, and the module size
resolution parameter γ was set to one, the default25,26.
Based on the modularity assignments identiﬁed in the previous step, we then
derived the participation coefﬁcient and within-degree Z-score for each node. The
participation coefﬁcient Pi quantiﬁes the degree of connection that a node
entertains with nodes belonging to other modules: the more of a node’s
connections are towards other modules, the higher its participation coefﬁcient will
be ref. 8. Conversely, the participation coefﬁcient of a node will be zero if its
connections
are all with nodes belonging to its own module.
M  2
X
κis
ð4Þ
Pi ¼ 1 
ki
s¼1
Here, κis is the strength of positive connections between node i and other nodes in
module s, ki is the strength of all its positive connections, and M is the number of
modules in the network, as identiﬁed by a given modularity detection algorithm.
The participation coefﬁcient ranges between zero (no connections with other
modules) and one (equal connections to all other modules). A network with high
average participation coefﬁcient can be expected to have high levels of integration
between its constituent modules.
Conversely, the within-module degree Z-score Zi is a measure of a node’s
connectivity with other nodes belonging to its module. It indicates how much
larger (or smaller) the node’s connections to other nodes in the module are, relative
to the average connection strength within that module. A node with high withinmodule degree Z-score has stronger-than-average coupling with the other nodes in
its module8.
zi ¼

κis  κis
σ κis

ð5Þ

where κis is the strength of connections between node i and other nodes in module
s, and κis and σκis are respectively the average and the standard deviation of κis over
all nodes belonging to module s. The Brain Connectivity Toolbox was used to
derive both the participation coefﬁcient and within-degree Z-score for each node.
Subsequently, joint histograms of participation coefﬁcient and within-module
Z-score were produced for each timepoint (using MATLAB code made freely
available by Shine et al. at https://github.com/macshine/integration/)25, since
together, these two measures quantify both a node’s inter- modular and intramodular connectivity. For each subject, the joint patterns were then used to assign
each timepoint to one of two clusters, using an unsupervised machine learning
algorithm known as k-means clustering (setting k = 2)25. To avoid the possibility of
the algorithm becoming stuck in local minima, it was repeated 500 times with
random re-initialisation of the two clusters’ initial points. This was performed
individually for each subject and condition. Following Shine et al.25, Pearson
correlation was chosen as distance metric for the algorithm.
Finally, the cluster with higher mean participation coefﬁcient was labelled as the
integrated state, while the cluster with lower average participation coefﬁcient was
considered to be the segregated state25. For each subject, a centroid matrix of
functional connectivity was computed for each state, as the element-wise median of
the timepoint-speciﬁc FC matrices assigned to the cluster corresponding to that
state. The proportion of time spent in each state was also estimated, as the number
of timepoints assigned to that cluster, over the total number of timepoints.
Dynamic state connectivity analysis. Once an integrated and a segregated state
centroids had been derived for each subject and condition, we investigated how the
pattern of connectivity in each state varied between the conscious and unconscious
conditions. Since this work focuses on the common aspects of unconsciousness
induced by different means, we sought to identify which connections were signiﬁcantly affected in the same way in both datasets. This involved a two-step
analysis. First, for each state (integrated, segregated) the corresponding centroid
matrices were compared between Awake and Deep conditions, and between conscious controls and DOC patients. Thus, a matrix of mean differences was computed for each state in each dataset, so that the edge Wi,j represented the mean

difference across conditions in the strength of the connection between regions i and
j. Subsequently, the matrices were signiﬁcance-thresholded by setting to 0 any edge
that did not reach a signiﬁcance level of α < 0.05 (FDR-corrected for multiple
comparisons), as assessed by t-tests (paired for the propofol dataset, independentsamples for the DOC dataset). The resulting matrices of signiﬁcant edges were then
combined across datasets, to construct a matrix of common unconsciousnessinduced connectivity differences. In this matrix, if both signiﬁcance-thresholded
matrices had a positive edge at position i,j, edge wi,j was set to the minimum value
of the two; if both thresholded matrices had negative values at i,j, edge wi,j was
instead set to the maximum of the two (i.e. smaller absolute value); and wi,j was set
to 0 in all other cases. The presence of a non-zero edge in the resulting matrix
therefore indicates that the corresponding regions i and j show consistent changes
in their functional connectivity as a result of unconsciousness, regardless of how it
was induced—with the direction of the alteration being given by the sign of wi,j,
and its weight representing the minimum extent of such alteration. After performing this analysis for the integrated and segregated state, the same analysis was
also performed on the static FC matrices. This revealed whether any of the patterns
of change observed in the static FC were speciﬁcally due to changes in the segregated or the integrated state.
Brain graph construction. In graph theory, a graph G = (N,K), is a mathematical
representation of a network of N nodes (or vertices, typically represented as points)
connected by K edges (or links, typically represented as lines between pairs of
points). Here, subject- and condition-speciﬁc brain graphs were constructed by
thresholding the corresponding functional connectivity matrices (see above), so
that nodes were given by AAL-derived brain regions, and edges were given by their
functional connectivity. We thresholded each FC matrix proportionally, at density
levels ranging between 10 and 25%, sampled in steps of 5%. To ensure robustness
of the result, graph-theoretical metrics were averaged across thresholds for each
subject and session before analysis.
Since edge weight can be expected to carry biological meaning as the strength of
communication between different regions, we chose not to binarise the graphs. In
line with similar work9, we used weighted graphs for the analyses presented here,
made possible by the availability of algorithms for weighted graph analysis8.
To ensure that our results could not be attributed to our choice of node and
edge estimation, we ran the same graph-theoretical analyses (for static FC,
integrated state and segregated state, in both anaesthetised individuals and DOC
patients) with different parameter choices: for edges, we applied higher density
levels (30 to 50%, in 10% steps) and binarised rather than weighted edges; for
nodes, we used the 234 ROIs of the Lausanne scale 125 template69) (Supplementary
Figs. 11–14).
Graph metrics. The graph-theoretical properties used in this work are described
below, based on the deﬁnitions provided by Rubinov and Sporns8,67. Each measure
was computed for the static, integrated and segregated functional connectivity
matrix of each subject, for each scanning session. All graph-theoretical measures
were computed using the Brain Connectivity Toolbox8.
Characteristic path length (L) is a network-wide measure of how effortful it is
on average to move between different nodes in the network. This metric is
calculated as the average length of the shortest path d between every pair of nodes
in the network.
Pn  
n
j≠i dij
1X
ð6Þ
L¼
n1
n i
The characteristic path length is understood as inversely related to the ability to
integrate information across the whole network8.
The clustering coefﬁcient of node i (Ci) is a node-speciﬁc measure of how well
connected a node’s neighbourhood is; in a binarized graph, it is calculated as the
fraction of neighbours of the node that are also neighbours of each other.
Ci ¼

2ti
ki ðki  1Þ

ð7Þ

where ti is the number of triangles around node i, (for binarized graphs) or the
geometric mean of triangles around node i (for weighted graphs). The mean of all
nodes’ clustering coefﬁcients (i.e. the network’s mean clustering coefﬁcient)
indicates how well connected, on average, the neighbourhoods present in the
network tend to be. When applied to brain networks, the clustering coefﬁcient is
thought to represent the degree of information integration at a local level, and
hence the potential for efﬁciently performing specialised, segregated local
processing8.
Both the characteristic path length and mean clustering coefﬁcient are typically
provided as normalised, i.e. divided by the corresponding metric of a random
graph with the same number of nodes and edges, and preserved degree
distribution8. Here, we used the average of the same measures computed for 100
random graphs, each constructed by randomly rewiring each edge in the original
graph 100 times.
Small-worldness: a network is considered to be small-world if it has both the
high mean clustering coefﬁcient typical of regular lattice networks, but also the
small characteristic path length typical of random networks40. Small-worldness
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represents the balance between integration/global processing (low characteristic
path length) and segregation/local processing (high mean clustering coefﬁcient),
and is summarised by S, the ratio of the graph’s normalised mean clustering
coefﬁcient to normalised characteristic path length8..
Sgraph ¼

Cgraph
Crandom
Lgraph
Lrandom

H¼

pi logðpi Þ= logðnÞ

4.
5.

ð8Þ
6.

Connectivity entropy. Complexity of a given state of functional connectivity was
estimated by the mean normalised Shannon entropy of the connections of each
ROI. Following the procedure of Saenger et al.42, the connectivity values in each
column of the matrix were assigned into n bins to construct a distribution, and a
normalised version of the Shannon entropy of this distribution was computed for
each node according to the following equation42:
n
X

3.

7.
8.
9.

ð9Þ

i¼1

To constrain the entropy values between 0 and 142, the original Shannon
entropy was normalised by the Shannon entropy of a uniform distribution, which
corresponds to log(n). Here, we followed Saenger and colleagues42, always using
n = 10 bins.
Statistical analysis. The statistical signiﬁcance of within-group differences
between the awake and deep anaesthetised conditions was determined with nonparametric permutation t-tests (repeated-measures), with 10,000 permutations.
Permutation- based two-samples t-tests with 10,000 permutations were instead
used to assess group differences between the awake condition of the propofol
dataset (used as healthy control group) and the DOC patients, and between the TBI
and HBI subgroups of DOC patients. All tests were two-sided. For measures that
showed a signiﬁcant difference, the effect size was also estimated using Hedge’s g.
When subnetwork-speciﬁc analyses were performed, the Benjamini–Hochberg
procedure70 was adopted to control the false discovery rate across multiple
comparisons, at a corrected α level of 0.05. This procedure was also applied for the
analysis of FC matrix differences.
For the statistical analyses performed on brain maps (ICC and SampEn), grouplevel comparisons were implemented as a GLM, using parametric paired t-tests for
the differences between awake and deep anaesthesia conditions, and unpaired ttests for the differences between DOC patients and controls. All tests were twosided. The resulting output maps of group differences were thresholded at
voxelwise p < 0.001 (uncorrected), and corrected for multiple comparisons by
applying a family-wise error (FWE) cluster-based correction, resulting in p < 0.05.
These steps were performed within the SPM12-based CONN toolbox for the ICC
analysis, and directly in SPM12 for the SampEn analysis.

10.
11.
12.

13.
14.

15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.

22.

Data availability

23.

The data that support the ﬁndings of this study are available from the corresponding
author upon reasonable request. Source data underlying Figs. 2 and 3, Supplementary
Figs. 10–14 and Supplementary Tables 6–17 are provided as a Source Data ﬁle.

24.

Code availability

25.

The CONN toolbox is freely available online (http://www.nitrc.org/projects/conn). Code
for the “cartographic proﬁle“25 is freely available online (https://github.com/macshine/
integration/). The Brain Connectivity Toolbox code used for graph-theoretical analyses is
freely available online (https://sites.google.com/site/bctnet/). The Brain Entropy Toolbox
is freely available online (https://cfn.upenn.edu/zewang/BENtbx.php). The code used to
compute the Sample Entropy (SampEn) of motion timeseries in MATLAB is freely
available online (https://uk.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/ﬁleexchange/35784-sampleentropy).
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